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der Welt sich bekundenden Gottes werden sie sich seiner Allmacht bewusst und dadurch gestärkt."

Schröer² makes *da=wenn=wenn auch, obgleich*:

"Wenn die Engel auch das Wesen der Sonne nicht ergründen können, so erhebt sie doch ihr Anblick."

Thomas³ says this is hardly possible, and refers to Grimm, *Wb.*, where *da* is not once quoted in that sense. He proposes *since* as the proper meaning. Strehlke, *Wb.*, quoted by Thomas, gives it the meaning of *da wo*.

The difficulties disappear, if we take *wenn*, varied, as Schröer properly intimates, by *da*, not with the now usual hypothetic meaning, but as denoting the co-existence of two co-ordinate facts placed side by side adversatively. In the eighteenth century *wenn* was frequently used in this sense, where now we should use *während*; see Paul, *Wb.*, p. 533, where the following examples are quoted:

"sie führen uns in Gängen voll Nacht zum glänzenden Throne der Wahrheit, wenn Schul-lehrer in Gängen voll eingebildeten Lichts zum düstern Throne der Lügen leiten" (Lessing);

"fehlet Bildung und Farbe doch auch der Blüte des Weinstocks, wenn die Beere, gereift, Menschen und Götter entzückt" (Goethe);

"durch immer schönere Gedankenformen schreitet der philosophische Geist zu höherer Vortrefflichkeit fort, wenn der Brotgelehrte das unfruchtbare Einerlei seiner Schulbegriffe hütet" (Schiller).

By taking *wenn* in this sense we get rid of the strained thought involved in the assumption of a causal or concessive relation between the two clauses.

II.

318 Da dank ich euch; denn mit den Todten
Hab' ich mich niemals gern befangen.

Thomas translates the second line by "I have never cared to concern myself," and adds "This use of *befangen*=*befassen* is very rare, seemingly a *ἀπαξ λεγόμενον*, so far as Goethe is concerned." Paul, *Wb.*, states its use with Jean Paul to be (*öfters*)=*sich befasen*. The

² Page 18.

³ P. 246.

expression *sich befangen*, however, was quite frequently used in northern Germany during my early years (1860-1870), and I have the impression of an admixture of the meaning of *physical contact* with the meaning of 'concern,' which makes Goethe's expression very vivid.

III.

554 Ja, eure Reden, die so blinkend sind,
In denen ihr der Menschheit Schnitzel kräuselt,
Sind unerquicklich wie der Nebelwind,
Der herbstlich durch die dürrn Blätter säuselt!

Hayward translates: "In which ye crisp the shreds of humanity."

Bayard Taylor: "Where ye *for* men twist shredded thought like paper."

Thomas: "Prink up humanity's leavings, (or, perhaps) twist gewgaws *for* men."

Bayard Taylor, in a note, justly objects to taking *der Menschheit* as a genitive; yet his "shredded thought like paper" is, I think, far from representing the exact idea. *Schnitzel kräuseln* means "cut up and curl paper" (especially scraps of paper) for ornaments, like for instance, those put round candles to receive their drippings (French *bobèches de papier*); the meaning, then, would be: Your glittering speeches which are humanity's flimsy ornaments.

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NOTE ON THE TIME ANALYSIS OF MACBETH Act iii, Sc. iv—Act. iv, Sc. i.

THE accepted analysis of the time in the last part of the third, and the first part of the fourth act of Macbeth, made by Daniel, in the New Shakspeare Society's *Transactions for 1877-79*, places Act iii, sc. 5, on the same night as Act iii, sc. iv, and supposes that Act iv, sc. i, took place on the following morning. This view is supported by Act iii, sc. iv: 132-133, where Macbeth says:

..... "I will tomorrow,
And betimes I will, to the weird sisters."

The objection to accepting this analysis lies in the fact that Act iii, sc. vi (which Mr. Daniel indeed rejects, perhaps needlessly), evidently

does not take place on the same night as Act iii, sc. iv; for in Act iii, sc. iv, 130, Macbeth says he has heard casually that Macduff denies him his presence, and that he will send to find out whether this is true; while in Act iii, sc. vi, 21-40 Lennox says that Macduff "from broad words and 'cause he failed his presence at the tyrant's feast" lives in disgrace, and has fled to England to make preparations for war. In order to account for this confusion, the suggestion has been offered that Shakspeare added Act iii, sc. vi as an after-thought, in order that the two witch scenes might not follow each other in immediate succession; and that in inserting the scene, he forgot, or purposely neglected, the time of the action. It seems hardly probable that Shakspeare, even though he did not always perform his work with strictest attention to detail, should have committed so inexcusable a blunder. If his only motive had been to separate the witch scenes, his ingenuity could have found some method of doing it which would not have affected so directly the action of the play.

Another solution of the difficulty has been offered and made on the supposition that Macbeth was in the habit of visiting the weird sisters, and that the two scenes described took place on two different occasions; that Act iii, sc. v, is on the same night as Act iii, sc. iv, and that it shows the preparation of the sisters for Macbeth's visit on the morrow; furthermore, that there is an interval between Act iii, sc. v, and Act iii, sc. vi; and that the action of Act iii, sc. vi, and Act iv, sc. i, takes place on succeeding days. This method of interpretation obviates the necessity of explaining the insertion of Act iii, sc. vi, but it does not seem entirely satisfactory; because such an interpretation of the sequence of the scenes leaves the reader in ignorance of what Macbeth considered an important meeting with the witches, and also makes the witches tell him at the second meeting what he would have wanted to find out at the first.

A new suggestion, however, may now be offered, and a different explanation of the time relation of these particular scenes may perhaps be worthy of consideration. This suggestion is an extremely simple one; it depends merely upon a trifling change in the Folio punctuation

of two lines in the scene. In other words, the suggestion is made to place a period after "I will tomorrow" in Act iii, sc. iv, 132; and to omit any mark after "And betimes I will" in line 133. The lines will then read: "I will tomorrow. And betimes I will to the weird sisters;" that is, I will send tomorrow. Punctuating in this way we find that "I will tomorrow" refers to what Macbeth has just said about sending to Macduff; and that the words "And betimes I will" refer to his visit to the weird sisters which is to be made in the near future, but not on the morrow. The interval then will fall between Act iii, sc. iv, and Act iii, sc. v; while Act iii, sc. v—Act iv, sc. i, take place on a later night and the following morning.

The objection may be raised that in this way the reference in Act iii, sc. vi, 21-40, to Macduff and Macbeth, and the second reference to the same events in Act iv, sc. i: 140 sq. would be placed in opposition. This objection is scarcely valid, for although it is true that in arranging the time as Mr. Daniel advocates no question arises of this difficulty, the conflict will be found if the interval be placed between Act iii, sc. v, and Act iii, sc. vi. In the present interpretation and method of analysis of the scenes, and indeed in the second scheme of analysis, the difficulty might be avoided by supposing that "the king" in Act iii, sc. vi, 39, refers, as the Folio seems to indicate, to the English sovereign and not to Macbeth. This may be rather hard to believe since in the next line but one Lennox says: "Sent he to Macduff?" where the "he" plainly means Macbeth. Still, in his intense interest in the question under discussion, it is conceivable that Lennox might speak of the person uppermost in his mind as "he," without considering what reference the pronoun might have to anything which had just preceded. This supposition that it is the King of England, and not Macbeth, who is preparing for war, is further borne out by Macbeth's attitude, in Act iv, sc. i, 140 sq., when he is informed of Macduff's flight. If he had known of the flight before, there would be no excuse for his surprise when he hears of it, and there would be less excuse, granted that the surprise was feigned, for the soliloquy which immediately follows. Nor in this solilo-

quy is it necessary to interpret Macbeth's remark that time had anticipated his dread exploits to mean that he had not yet sent to Macduff. Why could not Shakspeare have wished us to infer that time had prevented Macbeth from meting the same fate to Macduff that he had already done to Duncan and Banquo?

Aside from this question, however, through this new method of dividing the time of the play as suggested, the difficulties of the other two analyses would be done away with, and at the same time advantages of both would be retained. In the first place, the action of Act iii, sc. vi, is thrown into its proper perspective if we imagine the scene to have taken place after Act iii, sc. iv, and yet the scene does not become merely an interpolation marring the harmony of Act iii, sc. v, and Act iv, sc. i. In the second place, if we recognize the interval here we find that the action of Act iii, sc. v, and Act iv, sc. i, is centralized, and not only are we able to see the preparations for that crucial visit of Macbeth, but we are also brought face to face with the visit itself and we can watch the most minute development without being obliged, as in the former case, to piece together two scenes by imagining the sequel to the first and the introduction to the second. If the Macbeth were less a drama of action we might conceive that Shakspeare had given us merely two disconnected scenes, but when, as here, one event is so closely connected with another, and follows it in quickest succession, it is difficult to believe that he would willingly scatter our attention. And so long as this difficulty of the time does exist, it would seem perhaps that the spirit of the play would be less marred and more easily understood by a mere change in the punctuation of a line in the Folio, than by long explanations of what otherwise seems almost inevitable. Some consideration at least may be given to this suggested interpretation and punctuation of the lines Act iii, iv, 132-133: 'I will [that is, send] tomorrow. And betimes I will to the weird sisters.'

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF RHETORICAL THEORY.

Two opposing conceptions of the nature of dis-

course bequeathed to us from classic times still struggle for dominance in our modern rhetorical theory,—the social conception of Plato and the anti-social conception of the Sophists.¹ The latter, though known to us only fragmentarily from allusions and quotations in later treatises, can be, in its essential outlines, easily reconstructed. According to the sophistic teaching, discourse was simply a process of persuading the hearer to a conclusion which the speaker, for any reason, desired him to accept. Analyzed further, this familiar definition discloses certain significant features.

First of all it conveys, though somewhat indirectly, a notion of the ultimate end of the process of discourse. Why should discourse take place at all? Why should the hearer be persuaded? Because, answers the definition, the speaker wishes to persuade him. And, to pursue the inquiry still further, the speaker wishes to persuade the hearer to a certain belief presumably because he recognizes some advantage to himself in doing so. We should conclude, therefore, from examination of the definition before us, that discourse is for the sake of the speaker.

Nor is this conclusion threatened by further investigation into the pre-Platonic philosophy of discourse. It is true that the practical precepts of the sophistic rhetoricians pay great deference to the hearer, even seeming, at first glance, to exalt him over the speaker. Every detail of the speech is to be sedulously "adapted" to the hearer. Nothing is to be done without reference to him. His tastes are to be studied, his prejudices regarded, his little jealousies and chagrins written down in a book;—but all this, be it remembered, in order simply that he may the more completely be subjugated to the speaker's will. As the definition has previously suggested, the hearer's ultimate importance to discourse is of the slightest. To his interests the process of discourse is quite indifferent.

But not only does persuasion, according to the sophistic notion, fail to consider the interests of the hearer; frequently it even assails them. In fact, the sophistic precepts bristle with implications that the hearer's part in dis-

1. The use of the term "social" in connection with rhetorical theory has been borrowed directly from Prof. F. N. Scott of the University of Michigan; though for the interpretation here put upon the word, he is not necessarily responsible.